E 416 
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SPEECH 



HON. H. C. MURPHY, OF NEW YORK, 



SLAVERY IN THE TJERMTOMES. 



/ 



OELITERBD 



IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, MAY 17, 1848. 



^ 



^^>" 



U. S. A. 



WASHINGTON: 

l»RINTED At THE CONGRESSIONAL GLOBlS OFFICE. 

1848. 



E 416 
.n979 
Copy 1 



SPEECH 



HON. H. C. MURPHY, OF NEW YORK, 



SLAVERY IN THE TERRITORIES, 



/ 



-v 



a 



DELITEREDi 



m THE HOUSE OP REPRESENTATIVES, MAY 17, 1848. 




WASttlNGTON; 

l»RtNTED AT THE CONGRESSIONAL GLOB^ OFFICE. 

1848. 






SLAVERY IN THE TERRITORIES, 



The House being in Committee of the Whole on the state 
of tlie Union, and having under consideration the Navy Pen- 
sion Bill — 

Mr. MURPHY rose for the purpose of express- 
ing his views respecting the power of Congress to 
legislate over the Territories. He knew that this 
discussion was inopportune in some respects, and 
that the remarks v/hicli he proposed to make were 
not altogether in order; but following the example 
which had been set by the learned gentlemen from 
Virginia and South Carolina, [Mr. Bayly and 
Mr. Woodward,] he should venture to present to 
the House the views which he entertained-, es- 
pecially as. they differed from those of both the 
gentlemen to whom he had referred. 

He held that Congress has the power to legis- 
late for the Territories; and having that power, it 
had power over the question of slavery there. But, 
in his view, the great difficulty under which the 
gentlemen had been laboring arose from a confu- 
sion of idtas respecting the Territories of the Uni- 
ted States. They had not drawn the distinction 
between Territories acquired before and those ac- 
quired after the adoption of the Federal Constitu- 
tion. While expressing these views, he would 
here take occasion, at the outset, to say that he 
was no advocate of the Wilmot proviso. He did 
not stand here to defend it; at the same time he 
would not, with his views of the Constitution, and 
of the power of Congress, assent to the principle 
laid down by either the gentleman from Virginia 
or the gentleman from South Carolina. It ap- 
peared to him that those gentlemen had both pre- 
sented to this House heresies on this question, 
which had been pronounced such by the action of 
Congress over and over again, and which he 
should endeavor to establish as such before he had 
done. 

He held that Territories that were now free — 
Territories in which slavery did not exist — if an- 
nexed to this Union, remained free until Congress 
positively established it there; and for that reason 
he was opposed to the Wilmot proviso. He held 
that the Wilmot proviso was wholly unnecessary. 
It was worse, for it served only to create dissen- 
sions. But he did not, as some gentlemen ap- 
peared to, in view of that proposition, see dark 
clouds hovering over the country. He saw in the 
Constitution and the laws of the land principles 
which would carry them through in safety, and 
preserve for their children and their children's 
children their glorious Constitution and Confed- 
«racy. 

In the next place, then, he laid down the prop- 
osition that Congress possesses the power to 
legislate for the Territories acquired since the 



adoption of the Constitution as an incident to 
the power to acquire, ex necessitate rei; and is re- 
strained only by the conditions upon which the 
territory was ceded, and by the prohibitions and 
limitations of the Constitution. He also main- 
tained that the ordinance of 1787 was expressly 
adopted and continued in force by the Constitu- 
tion, and no further adoption by Congress was 
necessary; and that Congress was er.ipowered to 
make all laws which should be proper to carry the 
ordinance into effect. 

Mr. C. J. INGERSOLL. What was the opin- 
ion of Mr. Madison? 

Mr. MURPHY said he would answer the gen- 
tleman presently. In the discussion of these prop- 
ositions he would reverse the order in which he had 
stated them. Now, what was the territory of the 
United States? There was the territory that was 
ceded by the different States forming the confed- 
eracy before the adoption of the Constitution — the 
territory northwest of the Ohio. There were like- 
wise the cession by deed of Georgia in 1802, com- 
prising the present States of Alabama and Missis- 
sippi; the cession by treaty by France in 1803 of 
the territory which now comprised the State of 
Louisiana; and the cession by Spain by the treaty 
of 1819 of that which is now the State of Florida. 
And what else? The land which we acquired by 
discovery. Such was the Oregon territory. He 
deemed it unnecessary to do more than merely to 
advert to the opinions of Mr. Calhoun and Mr. 
Buchanan on tliis point. The principal ground on 
which they claimed a title to Oregon was that of 
discovery. To this fact he wished now to direct 
the attention of the committee, for purposes which 
would appear in the course of his argument. The 
ordinance of 1787, then, became of importance only 
in reference to the territory northwest of the Ohio. 
That ordinance and the action under it did not ap- 
ply to any othe^- territory than that northwest of 
the Ohio, and we have to look for other principles 
to govern us in regard to the other territory. 

He would now proceed to the consideration of 
the ordinance of 1787, for the purpose of showing 
the distinction between that and the sources of the 
power which we are to exercise over other territo- 
ries, and he had numerous authorities on this sub- 
ject at hand. He would simply direct the atten- 
tion of the committee to the ordinance of 1787, for 
it was unnecessary to read it, as every gentleman 
was doubtless familiar with its provisions. In the 
first place, that ordinance was declared to be a 
compact; and the articles thus agreed to and ar- 
ranged between the people of the United States and 
the people who were to form those territories were 
to continue forever in force, subject, however, to 



4 



certain restrictions. The language of the ordinance 
was: 

"It is hereby ordained and declared, by the authority 
aforesaid, that the following artieles shall be considered as 
articles of compact between the original States and the peo- 
ple and Stales in the said territory, and forever remain un- 
alterable unless by common consent." 

Again, in article 4Lh, are these words: 
" The said Territory, and the States wliich may be form- 
ed therein, shall forever remain a part of this confederacy 
of the United States of America, subject to the Articles of 
Confederation and to such alterations therein as shall be 
constitutionally made, and to all the acts and ordinances of 
the United States in Congress assembled conformable there- 
to." 

When this ordinance was passed, it thus appears 
from its own provisions that a new constitution 
was contemplated, and the people of the new ter- 
ritories and the territories themselves were to be 
subjected generally to the legislation of this new 
government under the terms of the compact. 

And now he would ansv/er the inquiry put to 
him by the gentleman froin Pennsylvania, who 
asked him if he knew what Mr. Madison said on 
tliis subject. Mr. Madison, it was true, said that 
the ordinance was passed with doubtful authority, 
but he went on afterwards to justify the passage of 
that ordinance. Mr. Madison said: 

"I mean not, by anything here said, to throw censure on 
the measures which have been pursued by Congress. I am 
sensible that they could not have done otherwise. The 
public interest, the necessity of the case, imposed upon them 
the task of overleaping their constitutional limits." 

He thus approved the measure, as did Mr. Jef- 
ferson, who was the author of the ordinance of 
1784, in this principle the same as that of 1787, 
and who would hardly have advocated it if it were 
unconstitutional. 

But he cared not whether that act was constitu- 
tionally made or not at the time; he said, and that 
was his position, that the Constitution of 1787 
confirmed that ordinance, and made it valid. Now, 
he had not seen, in the course of the debate on this 
question, the clause of the Constitution of the 
United States referred to, to which he should di- 
rect the attention of the House. He did not put 
the power of Congress to legislate over the Terri- 
tories, upon the clause authorizing Congress to 
make " all needful rules and regulations respecting 
the territory or other property belonging to the 
United States;" for he thought with the gentleman 
from Virginia, that the word " other" qualified the 
word " territory," and showed that it was spoken 
of here only as ^^ property" — giving Congress thS 
power to make all needful rules and regulations re- 
specting the territory as property of the United 
States. 

He fell in, therefore, with the view of the gen- 
tleman from Virginia on this point; but it was not 
necessary to rely upon the clause in question. 

For, to his mind, we had abundant confirmation 
of this ordinance in the Constitution itself. Would 
it not have been remarkable, indeed, if the Con- 
vention which framed the Constitution, sitting at 
the same time and place with that Congress which 
adopted this ordinance, had not made some provis- 
ion in regard to it.' When we regarded the fact, 
that the provision in reference to slavery in both 
instruments was adopted on the same day — the 
provision in the Constitutioji providing for the 
three-fifths representation of slaves, and the pro- 
hibition in the ordinance of slavery in the North- 



west Territory, and that after there had been the 
utmost contrariety of opinion in both bodies — 
could it be considered an accidental coincidence.' 
No, it was the result of conference; of consulta- 
tion with each other for the good of the country; 
of consultation in such a spirit as should be ever 
shown by us here. They compromised, so that 
while they allowed to the slave States the represent- 
ation of three-fifths of the slaves, they prohibited 
slavery in the Northwest Territory. 

But after the new Constitution was adopted, 
which Constitution itself recognized this ordinance, 
as he would presently show, a law was passed in 
addition, to carry into further eflect the ordinance 
of 1787. He would ask gentlemen to tell him how 
this law came to be passed, if they did not con- 
sider the ordinance in existence and valid.' He 
read an extract of the law, the preamble of which 
recited, that in order that the ordinance of 1787 
" may continue to have full effect," it is requisite^ 
&c. 

Mr. GAYLE. Is that an act of Congress .' 

Mr. MURPHY replied that it was. This oj'di- 
nance, then, was a compact, an engagement — a' 
contract between the people of the United States, 
in their collective capacity, and the people who 
should inhabit this new territory; and this express 
acknowledgment of this compact by Congress^ 
after the adoption of the new Constitution, as well 
as the recognition of it by the Constitution, made 
it binding, ratified it, and cured it of any unconsti- 
tionality under the Confederation which it might 
previously have been obnoxious to. The clause 
of the Constitution to which he referred was in 
these words: "All debts contracted and engage- 
' mcnts entered into before the adoption of this Con- 
' stitution shall be as valid against the United States 
♦ under this Constitution as under the Confedera- 
' tion." 

A gentleman near him said this had reference to 
a compact; true, and this ordinance is in terms 
declared to be a compact, an agreement, an engage- 
ment entered into on the part of the United States; 
and here was an express provision to ratify all "en- 
gagements." If it were no compact, no agreement 
between the United States and the people of the 
new territory, then he admitted this clause of the 
Constitution did not touch it. 

But this was no new doctrine on his part. Look 
into the debate on the Missouri compromise, and 
we had the authority of a distinguished Southern 
gentleman, the father of the honorable gentleman 
from Maryland, (the Hon. Louis McLane,) con- 
firming the view which he had taken. That dis- 
tinguished gentleman said, if it were a compact, it , 
was confirmed by the Constitution. These are 
his words; 

"This ordinance was considered doubtful until the adop- 
tion of the present Constitution, hy the first clause of thfr 
the sixth article of which it was supposed to be confirmed. 
But this confirmation shows it to be in the nature of a com- 
pact, and not of a law — a compact voluntarily entered into 
by all the parties connected with it — not incorporated in the 
present Constitution as a grant of power, or explanatory of 
its principles; but merely sanctioned by a single clause, pro- 
viding for the validity of contracts. It was a contract made 
by the party ceding the territory; it did not propose to affect 
the rights of persons residing there; it was to operate as a 
contract upon those who should subsequently remove thither; 
such persons, therefore, went under this ordinance; they 
voluntarily became parties to it;' and such only settled there 
as were willing to live without slaves, and subject to the 
terms of the compact." 



5 



Mr. HILLIARD interposed with the remark 
tliat Congress did not recognize the constitutional 
authority of the ordinance of 1787. They simply 
authorized the people of the Territory to organize 
and maintain a government; but none of the pro- 
visions of the act related to slavery. 

Mr. MURPHY said his argument was, that the 
ordinance of 1787 was confirmed by the Constitu- 
tion. He had alluded to the law to show that the 
first Congress thereafter, cognizant as its members 
must have been of the views of the framers of the 
Constitution, thought the Constitution had con- 
firmed the ordinance, and they passed this law for 
the purpose of giving it more full effect. That 
was the view in which he had used it. 

Mr. BAYLY (in his seat) was understood to 
inquire if the people of the Territory were con- 
sulted in this "compact.'" 

Mr. MUBPHY replied in the negative; they 
were not there. But this was a contract binding 
essentially upon the people of the United States, 
because it was voluntarily entered into by them 
inviting settlers to go there. It was, therefore, to 
be taken in the strongest manner against the United 
States. The gentleman from Virginia had addressed 
to the House the argument, that in none of the 
laws establishing territorial governments had this 
inhibition of slavery been contained, except in the 
case of Wisconsin, and in that case he had under- 
taken to explain it away. Now, if his (Mr. M.'s) 
view was correct, that this contract was binding 
on the United States, there was no necessity of 
introducing it; it was the law of the land; and, 
more, it was the supreme law, as it was ratified 
and confirmed by the Constitution. 

He came now to his second proposition: That 
Congress possesses the power to legislate for terri- 
tories acquired since the adoption of the Constitu- 
tion, as an incident to the power to acquire, ex 
necessitate; restrained only by the conditions of the 
cession, and by the prohibitions and limitations of 
the Constitution. Tiiis covered the territory which 
was really the subject of their discussion. As re- 
garded the territory northwest of the Ohio, there 
was no question raised in this House or in the 
country. It was in view of the new territory to be 
acquired in Mexico, comprising New Mexico and 
California, that this question assumed its great 
importance; and it was in regard to that territory 
that he deemed this his proposition to apply. Now, 
he held that the Constitution did not contemplate 
the acquisition of new territory. He found no 
power expressed in the Constitution to acquire 
new territory. He admitted, that where an express 
power was granted, it carried with it all the powers 
necessary to give it full force and effect. But there 
was no express power conferred by the Constitu- 
tion to acquire territory; if there was, he called 
on the gentleman from Virginia or any other gen- 
tleman to point it out. 

Mr. BAYLY (in his seat) was understood to 
refer the gentleman to the power to declare war. 

Mr. MURPHY. Is that a power to acquire ter- 
ritory? 

Mr. BAYLY. Certainly. 

Mr. MURPHY inquired of the gentleman if it 
was not incidental to that power, and also to the 
treaty power? It was a mere incident. How did 
we acquire territory? By treaty and by conquest. 



Was there any other power in the Constitution 
authorizing the acquisition of territory? 

Mr. BAYLY. None. 

Mr. MURPHY asked the gentleman, then, how 
the United States acquired the territory composing 
the States of Alabama and Mississippi? And how 
the territory of Oregon? They acquired the terri- 
tory of Alabama and Mississippi by the cession of 
Georgia, and the territory of Oregon by the dis- 
covery of Gray. Mr. Calhoun and Mr. Buchanan, 
as he had already observed, had, as Secretaries of 
State, taken the position that that was the primary 
ground and right of the United States to Oregon. 
Spain had no rights there: she had never followed 
up her discovery by settlement. It was contended 
at the time, and might be now, that we had full 
right to that territory by the discovery of Gray, 
and subsequent colonization and settlement. 

Now, we had the power to acquire territory not 
by an original, express grant in the Constitution, 
but first as incidental to the expressed powers; and 
also ^s an incident to sovereignty. He told the 
gentleman from Virginia he did not deny the right 
to acquire territory, but he said the right by which 
we acquired Alabama, Mississippi, and Oregon, 
was an incident of nationality. 

Mr. McLANE (the floor being yielded) ex- 
plained, that in the speech referred to by the gen- 
tleman from New York, [Mr. Murphy,] Mr. 
McLane, of Delaware, denied that the ordinance 
of 1787 gave Congress any power to prohibit 
slavery in the Northwestern Territory. Mr. Mc- 
Lane argued that this ordinance was good for 
nothing, except so far as it was supposed by some 
to be a compact; and as a compact would have 
acted directly on the people going into said terri- 
tory. But Mr. McLane himself did not admit it 
to be a compact, ratifiied by competent parlies to 
make a contract. 

Mr. MURPHY stated that he had taken the 
position that the ordinance was a compact, and 
that that compact was ratified and confirmed by 
the Constitution. He had referred to the ordi- 
nance of 1787 to show that it was a compact, and 
had then gone on to say, that, according to the 
argument of Mr. McLane, of Delaware, if a com- 
pact, it was ratified and confirmed by the Consti- 
tution. Mr. McL. said it was confirmed as a 
compact, not as a law. 

Mr. McLANE said, he never admitted it was a 
compact, then or now. 

Mr. MURPHY said it was declared by the 
ordinance itself to be a compact; but he was going 
on, before this interruption, to consider the ques- 
tion relative to the territory which was now the 
subject of their discussion. He had asserted that 
the provisions of the ordinance of 1787 did not 
apply to that territory; he had gone on further to 
say, that there were certain national powers, 
not derived from the constitntional grant — powers 
incident to this Government as a sovereign, in 
common with all other civilized nation.s — which 
we could exercise, and that among them was the 
right to acquire territory; and if we had not those 
powers, we had no right to the cession from Geor- 
gia of those two southern States which he had 
mentioned, and had no claim to Oregon on the 
ground of discovery. 

Now, if we had this power to acquire, he held 



that this other power to govern followed as an in- 
cident; and this was no new doctrine. It was laid 
down by Story, and by all the writers on the Con- 
stitution, and was affirmed by decisions of the 
Supreme Court. 

Before proceedino; to the authorities, however, 
let him ask, if this Government had the right to 
■ acquire territory, how it was to be governed? It 
was not sovereign. He agreed wiih the gentleman 
from South Carolina, [Mr. Woodward,] that it 
was a dependency, a province; the sovereignty 
was in Congress. The territory had not a single 
attribute of sovereignty; it was not recognized as 
such by the sister States or by the world at large; 
it was dependent on the power which had the right 
to acquire and did acquire it; that was the power 
which had the right- to govern it under certam 
limitations, to which he would presently refer. If 
this was not the case, who was to govern this 
territory? Would gentlemen tell him that that 
power was reserved to the people of the States inde- 
pendent of the Congress; or was it to be exercised 
by the State governments? If the territories were 
not to be governed by the people in it, or by the 
people of the States, or by the State governments, 
/lo-ic, let him ask, were they to be governed? The 
right to govern the territories atquired must neces- 
sarily exist in the government which had the title, 
which had the right to acquire. 

He had said that this principle had been settled. 
It was well known that the Supreme Court of the 
United States had again and again admitted the 
right of Congress to legislate for the Territories 
under the clause of the Constitution which autho- 
rized them to make " all needful rules and regula- 
tions," &c. He did not coincide with that view. 
But they had gone further; they had recognized the 
principle which he now asserted. Sustained by 
such authority, he thought he might assume this 
position with confidence. Chief Justice Marshall 
declared, in the case of the American Insurance 
Company et al. vs. Canter, that — 

" Perliap^ tlie power of governing a feiritnrv belonging 
to the United States, which has not, by becoming a State, 
acquired the means of self-government, may result necessa- 
rily, from the facts that it io not within the jurisdiction of 
any particular State, and is witliin the power and jurisdic- 
tion of the United States. The richl to govern may ho the 
inevitable consequence of the right to acquire territory." 

The principle was laid down by all our element- 
ary writers — Story, Rawle, and others — that the 
power to govern did not rest either in the people 
who inhabit the territories or in the several States 
in their separate capacities, or in the people of the 
States; for, if this was the case, it would not be 
exercised at all ; but that it was a necessary incident 
to the right to acquire in the United States to be 
exercised by Congress. 

He now came to his third proposition — that, 
until Congress passes new laws over acquired ter- 
ritory, the old municipal laws of the former govern- 
ments remain in force, subject only to the condi- 
tions annexed to the cession and the limitations of 
the Constitution; and every person settling there 
is sul ject to the local laws. He made this point in 
reference to New Mexico and California. They 
were settled countries, subject to civil laws. It was 
asserted that the Government of Mexico, having 
the right over those territories, had prohibited 
slavery in New Mexico and California. But, 
whether this was so or not, he was discussing the 



principle, whether a free territory could be made 
a slave territory except by the positive authority 
of Congress. He supposed, however, that slavery 
had been abolished by the Government of Mexico 
in these territories. Now, if there were no laws 
made by Congress, he asked how were the people 
of these acquired territories to be governed in the 
mean time, after the cession or conquest and until 
Congress did make laws for them ? Were they 
not, from the necessity of the case, to be governed 
by the laws which existed there before they were 
acquired by us? What were the precedents? What 
were the laws in Florida and Louisiana until Con- 
gress prescribed laws for them? Why, the old 
laws which prevailed before their cession. 

And this principle was recognized by all writers 
on public law. It would be found laid down in 
Blackstone. He begged to refer the committee, 
however, to the opinion of Lord Mansfield, in the 
case of Campbell vs. Hall; Cowper's Reports, vol. 
1, p. 208, from which he would read the following 
extract: 

" A great deal has been said and many authorities cited 
relative to propositions, in which both sides seem to be per- 
fectly agreed, and which, indeed, are too clear to be contro- 
verted. I will slate the propositions at large, and the first 
is this : 

" A country conquered by the British arms becomes a 
dominion of the King in the right of bis crown, and, tliere- 
fore, nece>sarily subject to the legislature— the Parliament 
ol Great Britain. 

"The second is, tbat the conquered inhabitants, once 
nceived under the King's protection, become subjects, and 
are to be universally considered in that light, not as enemies 
or aliens. 

"The third, that the articles of capitulation upon which 
the country is surrendered, and the articles of peace by 
which it is ceded, are sacred and inviolable, according to 
their true intent and meaning. 

"The fourth, that the law and legislative government of 
every dominion equally affects all persons and all property 
within the limits thereof, and is the rule of decision for all 
questions which arise there. Whoever purchases, lives, or 
dies there, puts himself under the law of the place. An 
Englishman in Ireland, Minorca, the Isle of Man, or the 
Plantations, has no privilege distinct from the natives. 

"The fifth, that the laws of a coiKjuered country continue 
in force until they are altered by the conqueror." 

According to these propositions, the territories 
of California and New Mexico will be free terri- 
tories if slavery does not now exist there; and 
slavery could not be introduced there except by 
the act of the sovereign power exercised over the 
territories which exists in the Congress of the 
United States. Slavery could not exist, either by 
the common law, or by the civil law of Spain, ex- 
cept by positive enacttuent. He would refer to 
the case of the negro Soiuerset, in 1772, in Eng- 
land, decided by Lord Mansfield, for the com- 
mon law doctrine, and to the Institutes of the 
Civil Law, for the rule of that law. Slavery is 
contra naiuram; it must be established by law, and 
is not to be presumed. It appeared, therefore, to 
him, that it was much luore important for the 
South to establish the power of Congress over the 
subject, than for the North. But he did not in- 
vite the question here: he deprecated it for the 
the .sake of the Union. But he felt bound to say 
to the gentlemen from the South, " beware.^' If 
this subject came into these Halls, it must be 
brought "here by gentlemen from the South seek- 
ing to establish slavery in the new territory, and 
he would, in a spirit of frankness, admonish them 
to beware how they came in collision with the free 
sentiment of the North. When it should be 



brought here properly, it would be met by repre- 
sentatives upon their responsibility to their constit- 
uents and the Constitution. 

Having but a very limited time, he should hurry 
along to make some general observations on this 
subject. He had no -wish to discuss the question 
of slavery in its moral, social, and^poiitical aspects, 
except so far as was necessary to make himself 
understood in discussing the question of power 
which had been brought into controversy. 

But it was proper at this time, when there was 
so much agitation throughout the country on this 
subject, that, in order that he might not be misun- 
derstood in the views which he had taken, he 
should express succinctly what his opinions were. 
He regarded slavery as the gentleman from South 
Carolina did — not as an institution. It was a per- 
version of terms to call it an institution, much less 
a republican institution. He regarded it as a con- 
dition of life which has been recognized by all 
laws, human and divine, from the foundation of 
the world in all countries to a late period; and is 
still in a large portion of the world. It existed by 
virtue of the principle of early international law 
that the conqueror has the right to dispose of the 
conquered. It was so recognized under the Mosaic 
dispensation. 

And hence, finding slavery existing in a large 
portion of this country, into which it was intro- 
duced without our efforts, and brought there witli- 
out our legislation, he was disposed to pay it that 
respect which every other kind of property, of 
whatever nature, was entitled to. And palsied be 
the hand that should interfere with the rights of 
the States to control slavery within their own lim- 
its ! When the question comes here, and comes 
legitimately, he hoped every man, whether from 
the' North or South, would be ready to meet it and 
to give a vote that will be consistent with the prin- 
ciples of the Constitution, and,subordinately there- 
to, reflective of the views of the constituents whom 
he represents; and if it comes here improperly, let 
every hand be sternly raised to put it hence. He 
lived in a free State, as it was called — a State in 
which there were free negroes, and he would assert 
from his own personal observation, that it was im- 
possible for the two races to live together on terms 
either of a social or political equality. 

The people of the State in which he lived had 
recently been called upon to vote on this question, 
and, by a majority of one hundred and forty thou- 
sand, they had refused to extend to the free blacks 
the right of sufiVage as enjoyed by the whiles. 
Why was that? Because it was repugnant to the 
feelings of the white population. We were taught 
by our mothers to avoid all communication with 
them; and the theorists and Utopians never would 
be able to bring about an amalgamation. There 
can be no commingling of the blood of the races; 
and yet that had been said to be the only way in 
which the barrier could be broken down. 

Wliile, then, the negroes remained this inferior 
race, they were doing them injustice by giving to 
them their freedom. When he heard, the other 
day, of the incident which occurred in this Dis- 
trict — he alluded to the carrying ofTof several slaves 
down the river — hefeltgreatpity,not fortheowner 
of the vessel, nor for the owners of the slaves, but 
for the slaves themselves. He knew that the mo- 
ment they left their comparatively happy homes, 



and were landed in a free State, they would be the 
objects of contumely and scorn, and would soon 
become adepts in vice and crime. Let him ask 
gentlemen who wished to carry slaves to the North, 
what would have become of them if they had been 
transferred there? 

It was a well-established fact, that the number 
of free negroes was rapidly decreasing in many of 
the New England States, and simply because the 
free negroes are forced to be vicious. They are 
not allowed to associate with the whites. They 
are driven from the employment of the whites. 
The women become degraded, and the men thievish. 
They cannot live in the free States and be perpet- 
uated; and he appealed to the friends of hurnanity 
to let them remain where they are, unless they can 
be emancipated entirely and sent to Africa. He 
could not believe that this black race had been di- 
minished by amalgamation. He knew, however, 
that there was hi^h authority recommending that 
course for the extinction of the blacks in the free 
States. . 

One of the greatest men of New England sug- 
gested, fifty years ago, that this process would 
go on. He held in his hand a sermon by the dis- 
tinguished Jonathan Edwards, in which he said: 

" It is not to be doulited but tliat the negroes in the north- 
ern Suites also will in time mix with the common mass of 
the people. But we have this consolation, that, as they are 
so small a proportion of the inhabitants, when mixed with 
the rest they will not produce any very sensible diversity of 
color." 

If that was to be the consequence, he would say, 
keep your slaves in the South, and he would go for 
enacting laws of a most penal character against any 
who shall bring the wretched beings to our free 
States, there to taint the blood of the whites, or to 
destroy their own race by vicious courses. 

Perhaps it might be doubted that such was the 
fact, that the numbers of the free negroes so sensi- 
bly decreased in the New England Stales. But he 
held in his hand a copy of the report of the com- 
mittee of the city council appointed to obtain the 
census of Boston for the year 1845, by Lemuel 
Shattuck, which gave some important information 
on this subject. The colored population of Bos- 
ton, in 1830, appears in that report to have been 
1,875; in 1845 it was 1,842. While the white pop- 
ulation has been increasing in that city, the blacks 
have been decreasing. It appears from the same 
table, that in 1742 the blacks were to the -whites as 
eight to ninety-two. In 1845, it was as one and sixty- 
one hundredths to ninety-eight. And this was the 
most favorable location to make the comparison, for 
it was in cities that the blacks congregated. If we 
look at some of the New England States, we find 
the decrease most marked. Thus, in New flamp- 
shire, the number in 1820 was 77G; in 1830, 604; 
and in 1840, 537. In Rhode Island, the number 
decreased from 3,560 in 1820 to 3,280 in 1840; in 
Vermont, from 903 to 730 in the same time; and 
in Connecticut 

The falling of the Chairman's hai-nmer, announ- 
cing the expiration of his allotted hour, prevented 
the completion of the sentence, and the honorable 
gentleman resumed his seat. 

Note. — Mr. Murphy was going on to say, when 
the hour expired, that in Connecticut, the number 
of blacks had follen off, between 1820 and 1840, 
from 8,044 to 7,195. But, however prejudicial 
a state of freedom among the white population 



8 



might be to the perpetuation of the negro race, or 
however beneficial in a while community slavery 
was to the negro, he was no advocate of slavery. 
He took the condition of the negro as he found it 
existing in our Confederacy, and wished to speak 
of it as he found it. To his mind, slavery was a 
greater curse to the master than to the slave. It 
made him indolent. It involved him in the employ- 
ment of the dearest kind of labor; though, perhaps, 
in some few cases where the climate was unhealthy 
for the white man, it might be different. It kept 
back enterprise, invention, and improvement; be- 
cause it devolved the labor, by which all those pro- 
gressed, upon the black slave who was brought up 
in ignorance. 

Note 2. — The following are the provisions of 
the constitutive acts and the decrees of the Mexi- 
can Federation, relating to the abolition of slavery 
in Mexico, referred to by Mr. Murphy: 

Constitutive Acts, adopted the 31st January, 1834. 
Article 30. It is the duty of the nation to protect, by wise 
and just laws, the rijjhts of man and of the citizens. — See 
IVhile's New Rccopilacion, vol. 1, p. 379. 

Decree. — ProhihUion of the commerce and traffic in Slaves. 
Freedom to those leho tread the Mexican territory. Penal- 
ties on those who introduce them. Period at which these 
penalties shall take effect. 
The Sovereign General Constituent Congress of the Me.xi- 

can United States has thouijht proper to decree as follows: 

1. The commerce and traffic in slaves, from whatsoever 
Power and under whatsoever flag they may come, is and 
shall be forever prohibited in tlie territory of the Mexican 
United States. 

2. Slaves introduced contrary to the tenor of the prece- 
ding article are free, from tlie fact alone of their treading 
the Mexican territory. 

3. Every vessel, whether national or foreign, in which 
slaves are transported and introduced into the Mexican ter- 
ritory, shall be irremissibly confiscated, with the remainder 
of her cargo; and the owner, tlie purchaser, the captain, 
the master, and the pilot, shall suffer the punishment of im- 
prisonment for ten years. 

4. This law shall go into effect from the very day of its 
publication ; but with regard to the penalties prescribed in 
the preceding article, it shall not go into effect until six 



months later, in consideration for the colonists who may 
land slaves with the object of introducing them into the 
Mexican territory in virtue of the law of the fourteenth of 
October last, respecting the colonization of the Isthmus of 
Guazacualco. 

Let it be published, &c. 

Mexico, July 13, 1824. 

Translated from the ori^nal "Coleccion de los Decretos 
y Ordenes del Soberano Congreso Constituyente Mexi- 
cano," (Mexico, 1825,) in the Library of the Department of 
State. 

Decree, September 15, 1829, by President Guerrero. — Abo- 
lition of Slavery. 

The President of the United Mexican States 

to the inhabitants of the Republic : 
Be it known : That in the year 1829, being desirous of 
signalizing the anniversary of our independence by an act 
of national justice and beneficence, which may continue to 
the strength and support of such inestimable welfare, as to 
secure more and more the public tranquillity, and reinstate 
an unfortunate portion of our inhabitants in the sacred rights 
granted them by nature, and maybe protected by the nation, 
under wise and just laws, according to the provision in arti- 
cle 30 of the constitutive act: availing myself of the extraor- 
dinary faculties granted me, I have thought proper to de- 
cree— 

1. Thai sl.avery be exterminated in the Republic. 

2. Cpnsequently, those are free who, up to this day, have 
been looked upon as slaves. 

3. Whenever the circumstances of the public treasury 
will allow it, the owners of slaves shall be indemnified in 
the manner which the laws shall provide. 

JOSE MARIA DE BOCANEGRA. 

See "Moody^s Facts for the People," p. 62. 

As additional evidence of the abolition of slavery 
in Mexico, the declaration of Mc-de Bocanegra, 
Minister of Foreign Affairs in Mexico, in his cor- 
respondence with Mr. Green, the charge d'affaires 
of the United States in 1844, may be cited. The 
Mexican Minister then said, slavery was a "relic 
of barbarous ages, proscribed by philosophy, and 
by the intelligence of the epoch"* — language which 
he would not have used in official correspondence 
if his own country had been liable to the censure 
which his remark implies. 



' See Vol. 1, Ex. Doc, 2d session 98th Congress, p. 54. 



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